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Abstract
Reducing tax evasion is a key priority for many governments, particularly in
developing countries. A growing literature has argued that the ability to verify
taxpayer self-reports against reports from third parties is critical for modern tax
enforcement and the growth of state capacity. However, there may be limits to the
eﬀectiveness of third-party information if taxpayers can make oﬀsetting adjustments
on less veriﬁable margins. We present a simple framework to demonstrate the
conditions under which this will occur and provide strong empirical evidence for such
behavior by exploiting a natural experiment in Ecuador. We ﬁnd that when ﬁrms
are notiﬁed by the tax authority about detected revenue discrepancies on previously
ﬁled corporate income tax returns, they increase reported revenues, matching the
third-party estimate when provided. Firms also increase reported costs by 96 cents
for every dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in total tax
collection.
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11 Introduction
Tax evasion limits the development of ﬁscal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2013), distorts
the allocation of resources in the economy (Skinner and Slemrod, 1985), and can result in
a reliance on economically ineﬃcient tax instruments (Gordon and Li, 2009; Best et al.,
forthcoming). A recent literature has shifted emphasis from the traditional idea of tax
enforcement through auditing (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) toward a focus on “third-
party information”: the ability to verify taxpayer reports against other sources, such as
an employer report of salary or the report of a ﬁrm’s trading partners (e.g., Kopczuk and
Slemrod, 2006; Kleven et al., 2010; Pomeranz, 2013). Third-party information is central
to modern tax collection in developed countries (Kleven et al., 2009), and the global
revolution in information technology has made third-party veriﬁcation easier than ever
before.1 Improvements in third-party information would appear to have the potential to
transform tax collection, particularly in developing economies.
In this paper, we show a fundamental limit to the eﬀectiveness of third-party in-
formation in improving revenue collection: the ability of taxpayers to make oﬀsetting
adjustments on less veriﬁable margins of the tax return. We demonstrate that this be-
havior can be expected under conditions common in many developing countries, where
capacity on other dimensions of the information and enforcement environment are weak.
We then provide strong empirical evidence of such adjustments in the context of a natu-
ral experiment in Ecuador, in which the tax authority notiﬁed ﬁrms about discrepancies
between their declared revenues and revenue reports from third-party sources. Firms
increase reported revenues in response to the notiﬁcations but oﬀset almost the entire
adjustment with increases in reported costs, resulting in only minor increases in total tax
collection.
We begin with a simple conceptual framework to motivate our empirical analysis. In
this model, which builds on Kleven et al. (2009),2 ﬁrms can reduce tax liability by under-
reporting true proﬁts. If the audit probability is a decreasing function of the reported
proﬁt rate, ﬁrms will have an incentive to “appear small” by under-reporting revenues
and potentially under-reporting costs. Third-party revenue reporting creates a ﬂoor on
reported revenues but will cause ﬁrms to oﬀset some of the resulting higher tax liability by
1Recent years have seen widespread adoption of electronic tax ﬁling and computerization of tax records
(OECD, 2011). Of the World Bank projects with a major tax or customs administration component in
the 1990s, over 75% included computerization of taxes and customs (World Bank, 2012).
2NBER Working Paper version.
2increasing reported costs. If enforcement capacity on non-third-party reported margins
is weak, as is the case in many developing countries, these oﬀsetting adjustments can be
large.
We analyze responses to third-party reporting empirically in the context of the cor-
porate income tax in Ecuador. In 2011 and 2012, the tax authority (Servicio de Rentas
Internas, SRI) notiﬁed a sample of almost 8,000 ﬁrms about discrepancies on previously
ﬁled corporate income tax returns between their self-reported revenue and information
about their revenue from third-party sources. Firms were asked to submit an amended
tax return to address the discrepancy. These notiﬁcations represent the ﬁrst time such
third-party information was used for tax enforcement in Ecuador in any systematic, large
scale way. The discrepancy notiﬁcations studied here are representative of how third-
party reporting is generally used in practice: the tax authority notiﬁes taxpayers about
discrepancies and requests that they amend.3
We ﬁrst document widespread misreporting of both revenues and costs relative to
third-party information in the cross-sectional universe of all formal ﬁrms (60,000 per year).
Firms’ self-reported revenues are lower than third-party reports in 24% of ﬁrm ﬁlings,
suggesting substantial scope for improvements in revenue collection through enforcement
based on third-party information. We observe little bunching at the third-party amount,
consistent with the fact that there was almost no use of third-party reporting by the
SRI prior to the notiﬁcations. We also ﬁnd direct evidence that at least some ﬁrms
under-report their costs. 23% of all ﬁrm ﬁlings and 5% of ﬁlings by ﬁrms with positive
tax liability report costs that are below third-party reported costs. Since third-party
reporting of costs is highly incomplete, these estimates provide lower bounds on cost
under-reporting. As discussed below, such under-reporting has important implications
for tax enforcement more broadly.
We next examine the eﬀect of the discrepancy notiﬁcations. Consistent with the idea
that lack of credible enforcement capacity can directly limit the eﬀect of information re-
porting, we ﬁnd that a substantial share of ﬁrms simply fail to ﬁle a requested amendment.
Our main results focus on ﬁrms that do ﬁle amended returns, but we still observe strongly
statistically signiﬁcant responses (mechanically attenuated) of both reported revenues and
costs in the full sample of all notiﬁed ﬁrms.
3Ultimately, expectations about such enforcement will be reﬂected in taxpayers’ original reports; we
discuss this further in Section 5.3.
3Among amending ﬁrms, the discrepancy notiﬁcations induce large increases in re-
ported revenues. When ﬁrms are given a speciﬁc third-party revenue amount by the tax
authority, 35% of all ﬁrms that ﬁle an amendment revise reported revenues to match the
indicated amount exactly. Firms that adjust reported revenues do so by 93 cents on av-
erage for every dollar of notiﬁed revenue discrepancy. This relationship holds throughout
the distribution, including for discrepancies in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. When
ﬁrms are told that there is a discrepancy but are not provided with a speciﬁc amount,
revenue adjustments are substantially lower (only 36 cents for every dollar of discrepancy
on average). This provides strong evidence that ﬁrms are misreporting both before and
after the notiﬁcations.
However, the eﬀects of these increases in reported revenues on tax payments are
severely limited because ﬁrms oﬀset the majority of increases in reported revenues with
increases in reported costs. For every dollar of revenue adjustment, ﬁrms increase reported
costs by 96 cents. These eﬀects again hold throughout the distribution. Changes in
reported proﬁts were therefore relatively minor, implying that that third-party reporting
had little eﬀect on pre-existing levels of evasion (proﬁt under-reporting). Cost oﬀsets are
similar regardless of whether or not ﬁrms know the exact revenue discrepancy, and we see
no correlation between pre-notiﬁcation reported proﬁt rates and implied proﬁt rates on
the amended portion of the return. Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate that ﬁrms are
deliberately targeting their reported cost adjustments to their revenue adjustments. We
also see evidence that ﬁrms choose cost adjustments on line items that are diﬃcult for
the tax authority to verify. For example, the most frequent cost adjustment is to “Other
Administrative Costs.” As a result of these oﬀsetting cost adjustments, tax collection is
an order of magnitude less than it would have been had ﬁrms only adjusted revenues.
Our paper contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, we demon-
strate important limits to tax enforcement through third-party reporting, the primary
mechanism through which modern governments are able to collect taxes in practice.
Third-party reporting has primarily been studied in highly developed countries, in which
information reporting is relatively complete and the capacity of the tax authority is high
(Slemrod, 2008; Long and Swingden, 1990; Kleven et al., 2010; Gillitzer and Skov, 2013).4
4An exception is Best (2014) who shows that salary reporting by ﬁrms limits income tax evasion in
Pakistan. See also related work by Kumler et al. (2013) and Naritomi (2013) who examine how changing
the incentives of consumers and workers can aﬀect ﬁrm compliance and Pomeranz (2013) on how third-
party reporting may facilitate tax enforcement in the VAT. Sanchez (2014) studies the eﬀects of messages
regarding incorrect computations of advance tax payments in the context of Ecuador.
4A natural question is whether this form of tax enforcement can be equally eﬀective in
developing countries. This is a critical question, since tax evasion is one of the primary
challenges faced by developing country governments and recent advances in information
technology suggest the potential for dramatic improvements in revenue collection through
the use of third-party information.
Since we have data for periods in which third-party information was available but
not used by the tax authority for enforcement, we can document and quantify the extent
of misreporting by ﬁrms as well as directly examine their behavioral responses to the
introduction of this form of tax enforcement. We provide clear causal evidence that the
beneﬁts of third-party reporting can be undermined when other aspects of the institutional
environment are weak, since taxpayers make oﬀsetting adjustments on margins that are
diﬃcult to verify. An advantage of our setting is that all notiﬁcations refer to previously
ﬁled returns, so ﬁrms cannot adjust real behavior. We can therefore cleanly isolate the
observed responses as pure changes in reporting, something that is typically challenging
when examining the eﬀects of tax or other policy changes. Our results show that this
method of tax enforcement – on its own – may have limited eﬃcacy in low capacity
settings: there are likely to be important complementarities between tax enforcement
through third-party reporting and investments in “traditional” auditing and enforcement
capabilities.5 Our ﬁndings – both the observed cross-sectional patterns of misreporting
and ﬁrm responses to the notiﬁcations – can be reconciled in a parsimonious model of
ﬁrm tax evasion.
Second, our paper contributes more generally to a relatively new empirical literature
on public ﬁnance in developing economies using administrative tax data (see Besley and
Persson, 2013, for a recent review). Our ﬁndings are complementary with an emerging
set of studies that demonstrate that optimal tax policy may diﬀer across developed and
developing countries as a result of diﬀerences in information and enforcement constraints
(e.g., Gordon and Li, 2009; Best et al., forthcoming). Speciﬁcally, these results suggest
that governments should set the tax base taking into account the degree of third-party
information on the base as a whole. Our results also add to a very limited empirical
literature examining the role of technology in improving developing country public sector
performance (see, e.g., Lewis-Faupel et al., 2014; Muralidharan et al., 2014).
5Our framework also predicts such behavior in the small segments of developed country economies
that face similar institutional constraints, which is consistent with subsequent ﬁndings in Slemrod et al.
(2014). See also Klepper and Daniel (1989) who examine cross-sectional patterns of misreporting across
types of line items in the United States.
5Third, our results relate to the literature on multitasking. In the classic multitask-
ing problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), increasing monitoring on one margin will
cause agents to adjust not only on the monitored margin but also on other, unmonitored
margins. This paper provides the ﬁrst evidence showing how individual taxpayers adjust
their costs when monitoring of their revenues increases. These ﬁndings are complementary
with Yang (2008), who shows that increased enforcement on one method of customs duty
avoidance in the Philippines prompts importers to shift to an alternative duty-avoidance
method.
Finally, we are able to study the micro-economics of ﬁrm tax misreporting using
administrative data. One key novel ﬁnding is that some ﬁrms under-report their true
costs, a result that is consistent with our conceptual framework but runs counter to
a natural intuition that evading ﬁrms would always inﬂate their reported costs.6 Our
framework provides a micro-foundation for the idea that ﬁrms may understate overall
economic activity to “ﬂy under the radar”of tax or other regulatory authorities (Almunia
and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2013). Under-reporting of costs also has important implications.
If ﬁrms do not have incentives to fully declare costs, the self-enforcement mechanism in
the value added tax (VAT) can be undermined (see, e.g., Keen and Smith, 2006). Cost
under-reporting could also encourage some ﬁrms to remain in the informal sector: formal
ﬁrms may be willing to trade with informal supplier ﬁrms even if these ﬁrms cannot
provide valid receipts to deduct input costs, a limitation that would otherwise create a
disincentive to informality (De Paula and Scheinkman, 2010).
Our results highlight the importance of other aspects of the enforcement environment
in determining the eﬀectiveness of third-party reporting. When third-party reporting is
highly incomplete and enforcement capacity is weak, as is the case in many developing
economies, the eﬀect of third-party reporting on revenue can be dramatically limited as
taxpayers respond by adjusting reports on less veriﬁable margins of the tax return. From
a policy perspective, our results indicate that third-party reporting alone is unlikely to
provide an easy and immediate solution to the problem of improving ﬁscal capacity in
low-income economies. This does not necessarily mean that countries should not invest
in information technologies that support third-party reporting. As we discuss in the
concluding section of the paper, third-party reporting could be a powerful tool for tax
collection as the scope of transactions covered by third-party reporting expands and the
6This result is consistent with Kopczuk (2012), who shows that the introduction of a ﬂat tax in Poland
lead to increases in both declared revenues and declared costs.
6ability to monitor and enforce compliance on non-third-party reported margins increases.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual
framework for examining the eﬀects of third-party reporting on ﬁrm tax evasion. Section 3
describes the Ecuadorian tax system and outlines our empirical predictions. Section 4
discusses the data and methods. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Third-Party Reporting in the Allingham-Sandmo Frame-
work
In this section, we develop an illustrative model of the eﬀects of third-party reporting
on ﬁrm tax evasion to guide our empirical analysis. We begin with a brief review of the
standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) framework and Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2009)
(henceforth KKS), who embed third-party reporting into this framework.
In the Allingham-Sandmo model, which is an application of the Becker (1968) model
of crime to the context of tax evasion, taxpayers have true income, W, and choose their
level of reported income, c W. They pay tax on their declared income at rate τ. Evasion is
detected with probability p, in which case they must pay the owed tax as well as a penalty
(at rate θ) on the evaded tax (Yitzhaki, 1974). Taxpayers then maximize expected utility,
with the ﬁrst order condition of the following maximization problem implicitly deﬁning
c W ∗.
EU = (1 − p)U(W − τc W) + pU(W − τW − θτ(W − c W))
A limitation of the Allingham-Sandmo model is that it is diﬃcult to reconcile low
observed audit rates and penalties with the generally low levels of tax evasion on many
forms of income. KKS (2009) address this concern by allowing W to be comprised of two
components: WT, which is third-party reported, and WS, which is self-reported. Taxpay-
ers choose the reported values of these income components: d WT and c WS. The detection
probability on third-party reported income is 1, so taxpayers will set d WT = WT. However,
in this baseline framework, third-party reporting will be irrelevant to tax collection: tax-
payers optimize over total c W, and c W ∗ remains unchanged. Therefore, taxpayers will fully
7oﬀset increases in d WT with adjustments to c WS. Additional constraints – for example, on
the detection probability function or on the level or sign of c WS – are needed to break this
irrelevance result.
2.2 The Case of Firms
We now build on this framework to model the eﬀect of third-party reporting on tax evasion
in the ﬁrm context. Firms have revenues and costs and pay a ﬂat tax on reported proﬁts,
deﬁned as reported revenues minus reported costs. Both revenues and costs are potentially
comprised of third-party and self-reported components. We will assume throughout that
true proﬁt π ≥ 0 and self-reported proﬁt b π ≥ 0. We therefore have:
R = RT + RS = revenues, b R = reported revenues
C = CT + CS = costs, b C = reported costs
π = R − C = proﬁts, b π = b R − b C = reported proﬁts
Tax = τb π
Note that there is an important inherent asymmetry in the eﬀect of third-party
reporting between revenues and costs. Firms can reduce their tax liability by under-
reporting revenues and/or over-reporting costs. If third-party reporting is partial, it
provides a lower bound on true values. If ﬁrms declare b R < RT, it is clear that they
are under-reporting revenues. However, if ﬁrms declare b C > CT, this could be due to
over-reporting of costs or due to legitimate costs that were not third-party reported. We
return to the implications of this asymmetry below.
2.3 Firm Responses to Third-Party Reporting
2.3.1 General Case
In a generalized version of the Allingham-Sandmo model, the detection probability is a
function of variables observed by the tax authority (ﬁrm reports and third-party reports).
The penalty conditional on detecting misreporting is a function of the tax rate, ﬁrm
8reports, and true revenues and costs.7
Firms solve the following maximization problem:
EU = (1 − p(b R, b C,RT,CT))U(π − τb π) + p(b R, b C,RT,CT)U(π − τπ − θ(τ, b R, b C,R,C))
We take RT and CT as given for the ﬁrm. This assumption is appropriate to our
empirical context, in which ﬁrms have no opportunity to take actions to change existing
third-party reports at the time the notiﬁcations are sent.
If revenues and costs enter the detection probability function and the penalty func-
tion only in terms of reported proﬁts, (b R − b C), ﬁrms can again fully oﬀset all eﬀects of
RT by changes to b C. An increase in RT will cause ﬁrms to increase b R, but they can
simultaneously increase b C, returning to their original optimal level of reported proﬁts
with no eﬀect on the detection probability or penalty. In this case, third-party report-
ing of revenue will have no eﬀect on pre-existing levels of tax evasion, τ(π − b π), or tax
collection. Note that, due to the asymmetry reason discussed above, having third-party
information on costs does not prevent this full oﬀset. Since third-party reporting creates
a ﬂoor on reported costs (not a ceiling), ﬁrms can increase their reported costs without
the tax authority being able to determine whether or not these costs are legitimate.8
As we show below, full oﬀsets may not occur if the detection probability or penalty
functions treat revenues and costs diﬀerentially. Nevertheless, the key result that ﬁrms
may respond to third-party information by adjusting reporting on margins for which third-
party information is less binding will continue to hold. This indicates an important link
between third-party reporting and traditional auditing, since the eﬀectiveness of third-
party reporting will ultimately be determined by the tax authority’s ability to enforce
non-third-party reported margins.
7We model ﬁrms as risk averse. This is a realistic assumption for many developing countries, where a
large share of ﬁrms are sole proprietorships or owned by a single family and corresponds more generally
to a context in which ﬁrms dislike volatility on proﬁts. This assumption also allows ease of comparison to
the standard Allingham-Sandmo framework. Here, we consider the optimization problem of an individual
ﬁrm. Please see Pomeranz (2013) for further discussion of cross-ﬁrm spillovers in enforcement.
8This asymmetry provides a micro-foundation for why costs may be easier to misreport than rev-
enues (Best et al., forthcoming).
92.3.2 Specifying the Detection Probability
We now consider a speciﬁc case of the detection probability function. We begin with a
baseline case in which the tax authority has no third-party information about the ﬁrm
but can observe whether ﬁrms’ self-reports seem “internally consistent.” The detection
probability is therefore a function of ﬁrms’ self-reported variables b R and b C.
Speciﬁcally, we now assume that the tax authority has some information about the
true distribution of proﬁt rates. If a ﬁrm reports $100 in proﬁts on $1,000 in revenue,
that is more plausible than if the ﬁrm reports $100 in proﬁts on $1,000,000 in revenue.
Correspondingly, we assume that the detection probability is p(b π+ε
b R ) where p′ < 0 and ε
is a small number greater than zero.9
This speciﬁcation of the detection probability function is appropriate for our empirical
context. In a number of ﬁeld interviews we conducted, tax authority staﬀ indicated that
the reported proﬁt rate is one of the key characteristics they consider when determining
whether to audit. Many of the ﬁrm owners and tax accountants we interviewed also stated
that they pay close attention to the choice of their reported proﬁt rate.
As in Allingham-Sandmo, the penalty is a linear function of the evaded tax. The
ﬁrm optimization problem is now:
EU = (1 − p(
b π + ε
b R
))U(π − τb π) + p(
b π + ε
b R
)U(π − τπ − θτ(π − b π))
Proposition 1. Since p′ < 0, ﬁrms will choose the lowest level of reported revenue con-
sistent with their reported proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, as ε → 0, b R∗ = b π∗. This then implies that
b C∗ = 0.
Proof. Conditional on b π, the ﬁrm prefers to minimize p. b R ≥ b π and p′ < 0 therefore
imply b R = b π and p = p(1). Deﬁne b π∗∗=b π∗(p(1)). Now note that the ﬁrm can change
b R while keeping b π ﬁxed (by adjusting b C), and this does not aﬀect expected utility at a
given p. This deﬁnes b R∗∗ = b π∗∗. The optimal choice of b C is then zero.
Intuitively, the ﬁrm will maximize its reported proﬁt rate b π
b R in order to minimize
its detection probability and chooses the optimal level of reported proﬁts b π given this
9The addition of ε diﬀerentiates among corner cases where b π = 0, so that declaring zero proﬁts on
a large amount of revenue is more likely to trigger additional scrutiny than declaring zero proﬁts on a
small amount of revenue.
10minimized detection probability. Firms can get to their desired level of proﬁts by adjusting
either reported revenues or reported costs, but under-reporting revenues gives the added
beneﬁt of reducing the audit rate. They will therefore not even report their legitimate
costs. This result arises from the assumption that the tax authority has no information
about true revenues and costs (which we relax below) as well as the assumption of a
monotonic p function.10
The Eﬀect of Third-Party Reporting We now introduce third-party information on
revenues. Following KKS (2009), we model third-party reported revenue (RT) as having
a detection probability of 1.
Proposition 2. Deﬁne b R∗ as the optimal ﬁrm choice in the absence of third party report-
ing. If RT ≤ b R∗, third-party reporting will have no eﬀect. If RT > b R∗, then b R∗′ = RT.
Proof. Since p = 1 if b R < RT, b R′ ≥ RT. Suppose that the ﬁrm chooses b R′ > RT implying
an optimal level of reported proﬁts b π∗′, and reported costs b C∗′. The ﬁrm can now reduce
b R′ and increase b C′ by some δ > 0. This results in the same level of reported proﬁts but
a lower audit probability and therefore higher expected utility. Thus, b R∗′ = RT
We can now examine the response of b π to RT. Deﬁne YN ≡ π −τb π (after tax proﬁts
in the non-detected state) and YA ≡ π −τπ −θτ(π − b π) (after tax proﬁts in the detected
state). Taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to b π, we have:
p(
b π + ε
RT
)U
′(YA)θτ − (1 − p(
b π + ε
RT
))U
′(YN)τ −
1
RT
p
′(
b π + ε
RT
)(U(YN) − U(YA))
The ﬁrst and second terms capture the standard Allingham-Sandmo trade-oﬀ: higher
evasion results in higher utility in the non-detected state but lower utility in the detected
state. The third term captures the fact that reports by the ﬁrm change the detection
probability. If p′ is close to zero, we would expect close to full oﬀsets ( ∂b π
∂RT ≈ 0). Intuitively,
this corresponds to the detection probability function being fairly ﬂat with respect to the
reported proﬁt rate. This could be the case, for example, if audit capacity is weak.
10This assumption could be modiﬁed so that a reported proﬁt rate that is “too high” also appears
suspicious. Since our main focus is on the eﬀects of third-party reporting, which creates a lower bound
on reported revenues, we retain the assumption of a monotonic p function for simplicity.
11Cost Under-Reporting One of the implications of our framework is that ﬁrms may
under-report true costs: in the case above, b C∗′ = RT − b π∗′, but b C∗′ ≶ C. Firms will
adjust reported costs in response to an increase in third-party reporting of revenues, but
the new level of reported costs may be larger or smaller than true costs. Intuitively, the
detection probability function creates incentives for ﬁrms to appear smaller on paper than
they are in reality by potentially under-reporting both revenues and costs. We present
direct empirical evidence in Section 5 that some ﬁrms do indeed under-report costs.11
2.3.3 Limits to Enforcement
Note that the detection probability p is the probability that the ﬁrm is caught and pun-
ished. We have so far assumed that p equals 1 if ﬁrms’ self-reported revenues are lower
than third-party reports. However, if there are limits to enforcement, p would still rise
discontinuously at RT but be limited below 1. This could occur if the tax authority
faces constraints on its ability to enforce tax collection, even conditional on observing
misreporting (Aparicio et al., 2011).
In this case, ﬁrms may optimally choose reported revenues that are below third-
party revenues, eﬀectively taking the risk that the tax authority will either not observe
the discrepancy or not enforce its elimination. Nevertheless, if p rises discontinuously at
RT, ﬁrms will never choose reported revenues just below this level, instead bunching at
RT.
We discuss the empirical predictions of the model in more detail in Section 3.3.
11Somewhat counterintuitively, this suggests that the tax authority could beneﬁt from higher reporting
of costs. In particular, if a ﬁrm is reporting b C < CT, forcing it to declare higher costs can result in higher
optimal reported proﬁts for the ﬁrm for some parameter values.
123 Background and Empirical Predictions
3.1 Firm Taxation and Third-Party Information in Ecuador
3.1.1 Rates and Reporting Requirements
We now turn to our empirical setting: the corporate income tax in Ecuador. Ecuador’s
per capita GDP in 2011 was approximately 5,000 USD.12 Tax revenues are around 12%
of GDP, with indirect taxes comprising about half and corporate income tax making up
the majority of the remainder. Oil-related royalties are also an important component of
public revenues.
All incorporated ﬁrms in Ecuador are required to ﬁle an annual corporate tax return
(Form F101). Pre-tax proﬁts are deﬁned as the diﬀerence between total revenues and total
costs. Firms must distribute 15% of pre-tax proﬁts among their employees and during
the years of our study were taxed at a ﬂat rate of 25% on the remainder. The 25% rate is
independent of ﬁrm size and was constant for over 20 years up to and including the years
that were aﬀected by the intervention in this study.13 There are no tax refunds for losses,
but losses can be carried forward, with some limitations, for 5 years with a maximum
carry-over deduction amount of 25% of proﬁts in any given year. The Ecuadorian ﬁscal
year corresponds to the calendar year and ﬁrms ﬁle the annual corporate tax return the
following April.
All ﬁrms are also required to ﬁle a monthly value added tax (VAT) return (Form
F104). In order to deduct input costs, this return must include a purchase annex listing
the amount purchased from each supplier along with the supplier’s tax ID. A similar annex
for sales to client ﬁrms must be submitted by ﬁrms with annual sales above 200,000 USD
as well as by Large Taxpaying Units, public sector ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions, credit card
companies, and ﬁrms requesting refunds of taxes withheld.
3.1.2 Third-Party Information and Cross Checks
The Ecuadorian tax authority (SRI) can check ﬁrms’ self-reports against several sources.
For example, it can use data from the purchase annexes to compare a ﬁrm’s self-reported
12Ecuador dollarized its economy in 2000. All ﬁnancial ﬁgures in this paper are expressed in USD.
13There are certain special provisions that apply to oil companies and public sector companies. These
ﬁrms are included in our full sample analysis but were not subject to the policy interventions.
13sales to the sum of all purchases reported from that ﬁrm by other ﬁrms. The SRI sup-
plements this information with credit card sales from credit card companies, exports
and imports recorded by the Ecuadorian Customs, and returns to ﬁnancial investments
recorded by ﬁnancial institutions. Since third-party reporting is incomplete, the resulting
estimates of ﬁrm revenues will generally provide a lower bound on true revenues.14
The ability of the SRI to utilize this third-party information is relatively recent.
Digitized purchase and sales annex data have only been collected since 2007 and discrep-
ancies were initially computed only in special cases, such as in the process of auditing a
large company. The SRI began conducting large scale cross checks of taxpayers in 2011,
computing revenue discrepancies for previously ﬁled corporate income tax returns.
3.2 Policy Intervention
Our results are based on a series of natural policy experiments in which the SRI noti-
ﬁed selected ﬁrms about detected discrepancies between ﬁrms’ self-reported revenues and
third-party reported information. Notiﬁed ﬁrms were asked to ﬁle an amended return to
address the detected discrepancy. While the speciﬁc ﬁrm selection methodology is con-
ﬁdential to the SRI, key factors included the magnitude of discrepancies and potential
tax adjustments. We discuss ﬁrm selection in the context of our empirical strategy in
Section 4.2 below.
We examine three rounds of notiﬁcations corresponding to tax returns from 2008,
2009, and 2010. We refer to these as the 2008, 2009, and 2010 rounds respectively. The
notiﬁcations corresponding to the 2008 returns were sent in August-September 2011; the
notiﬁcations corresponding to the 2009 and 2010 returns were sent in March-April 2012.
Note that in all cases, notiﬁcations were sent for previously ﬁled tax returns after all real
transactions for the relevant tax period had been completed. Therefore, any changes we
observe in response to the notiﬁcations are reporting rather than real economic responses.
For the 2008 round, 3,136 ﬁrms were selected for notiﬁcation. For the full original no-
tiﬁcation (in Spanish) see Appendix A2. The relevant portion of the message is translated
below:
14It is possible that there are errors or misreports on the annexes of ﬁrms’ transacting partners, but
given the incompleteness of third-party information, the resulting estimates of RT will still be underes-
timates of true revenues in most cases.
14“Dear Mr/Mrs [XXX], General Manager of Firm [XXX],
After reviewing the databases which it possesses, the Tax Administration has identiﬁed
revenue amounts that are attributable to the ﬁrm that you represent, which are larger than
the amount reported on its 2008 corporate income tax return. [...] The Tax Administration
requests that you submit an amended return for the year 2008 via internet within 10
business days.”
2,221 ﬁrms were selected for the 2009 round and 2,636 ﬁrms for the 2010 round. In
these rounds, the notiﬁcations also included the SRI’s calculation of ﬁrm revenue based
on third-party sources (Appendix A3). The relevant portion of the message is translated
below:
“Dear Mr/Mrs [XXX], General Manager of Firm [XXX],
After reviewing the databases which it possesses, the Tax Administration has identiﬁed
revenue amounts that are attributable to the ﬁrm that you represent, which are larger than
the amount reported on its 20XX corporate income tax return, as shown in the following
table:
Fiscal Year
Line Item of the
Corporate Income Tax
Value Calculated by
the Tax Administration
Value Declared
by the Taxpayer
20XX 699. Total Revenue $255,300 $190,500
[...] The Tax Administration urges you to submit an amended return for the year
20XX via internet.”
Notiﬁcations were sent by email to the address on record, which typically belongs to
the general manager or accountant of the ﬁrm. We observe ﬁrms’ initial ﬁlings as well as
any subsequent amendments made to their returns.
3.3 Empirical Predictions
We can think of the discrepancy notiﬁcations as eﬀectively introducing RT for notiﬁed
ﬁrms. Recall that the key eﬀect of third-party reporting is to create a threshold for
reported revenues below which there is a discontinuous increase in the probability that
misreporting is detected and penalized. Prior to the notiﬁcations, third-party information
was not used for enforcement purposes, except for selected audit cases. The detection
probability function faced by ﬁrms was thus equivalent to one in which the tax authority
15had no third-party reports (RT = 0).
In the full cross-section of ﬁrms, the absence of enforcement based on RT implies that
we should see little to no bunching at RT but we may have optimal reported revenues both
below the third-party level and above. The framework also predicts that some ﬁrms may
under-report costs, setting b C < C. While we do not observe real costs C, we can perform
a stricter test for cost under-reporting by examining whether ﬁrms report b C < CT. CT
is likely to be substantially smaller than C, since only a small share of ﬁrms are required
to ﬁle sales annexes. This test will therefore provide a lower bound on the extent of cost
under-reporting.15
We next turn to the predictions for the discrepancy notiﬁcations. All ﬁrms in the
policy intervention have b R < RT by deﬁnition, since the SRI sent notiﬁcations only to
ﬁrms that under-reported revenues relative to available third-party information. Our con-
text best corresponds to the “limits to enforcement” case in Section 2.3.3: ﬁrms could
only have been legally prosecuted for failure to submit an amended return if a written
notiﬁcation had been delivered to them in person by a member of the SRI staﬀ. This
is very expensive, and the email option for notiﬁcations was chosen due to resource con-
straints. If there are limits to enforcement, some ﬁrms may simply choose not to ﬁle an
amendment.
Finally, among ﬁrms that do ﬁle an amendment, we should see bunching of reported
revenues at RT when RT is disclosed, i.e., in the 2009 and 2010 rounds. In the 2008
round, in which RT was not disclosed to ﬁrms, amended reported revenues may be above
or below the actual RT. In all rounds, we expect to see ﬁrms oﬀsetting the increase in
reported revenue with an increase in reported costs. The magnitude of this eﬀect will
depend on the gradient of the audit probability with respect to the reported proﬁt rate:
large oﬀsets would imply a relatively ﬂat gradient.
15It is possible that supplier ﬁrms misreport sales, on which the third-party cost variable is based.
However, since the incentive is for ﬁrms to under-report revenues, this will typically result in a lower CT.
164 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data
We combine several sources of administrative data. Information about self-reported rev-
enues and costs on original and amended tax returns is compiled from the corporate
income tax form F101. We observe values for all line items as well as the submission
date for each amended version of the return. Firms can submit amendments to the F101
without presenting any additional documentation.
Revenue and cost discrepancies are calculated using third-party data. Speciﬁcally,
third-party reported revenue is the sum of exports, bank interest, and the maximum of
the sum of purchases from the ﬁrm reported by client ﬁrms and the sum of purchases
from the ﬁrm made using credit cards. Third-party reported costs are the sum of ﬁrms’
imports and sales reported by their suppliers. Purchases and sales reported by supplier
and client ﬁrms are calculated by the SRI using data from the F104 annexes described in
Section 3.
The third-party revenue measure was hand checked by SRI staﬀ for the sample of no-
tiﬁed ﬁrms, resulting in some adjustments. These adjusted measures of RT were provided
to ﬁrms in the 2009 and 2010 rounds and were calculated (but not provided to ﬁrms)
in the 2008 round. We use the adjusted third-party measure for evaluating responses
to the discrepancy notiﬁcations and the unadjusted measure for cross-sectional results.
In practice, the adjusted and unadjusted measures are highly correlated, and the policy
experiment results are robust to excluding ﬁrms for which adjustments were made.
We deﬁne the universe of economically active ﬁrms in a given year as those which
ﬁled an F101 and had non-zero revenues or costs, based on self-reported or third-party
reported information. In 2008, we do not have third-party reported information for ﬁrms
outside the notiﬁcation sample and therefore restrict the sample to ﬁrms with non-zero
costs or revenues based on self-reported information for this year.16
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the full universe of economically active ﬁrms
for ﬁscal years 2008-2010 (pooled). The sample includes 87,076 ﬁrms and almost 200,000
ﬁrm-year observations. The mean declared annual revenue is $1.58 million with a median
1623% of ﬁrms in the 2009-10 sample had zero costs and revenues based on self-reports but positive
values based on third-party reports.
17of $42,200. Declared costs have a mean of $1.48 million and a median of $41,600. Cor-
respondingly, there is a large range in tax liabilities. The mean is $23,000, the median
is zero, and the standard deviation is over $600,000.17 Firms’ self-reported revenues and
costs are higher than third-party reports on average. Note that since third-party infor-
mation is incomplete, this does not necessarily mean that ﬁrms are over-reporting these
values. In addition, as we discuss in detail below, a substantial share of ﬁrms report lower
revenues or costs than the third-party reports.
Table 2 Panel A shows summary statistics for the ﬁrms that were selected for notiﬁ-
cation in each round of the policy intervention (henceforth referred to as the “notiﬁcation
sample”). All numbers reﬂect the last pre-notiﬁcation ﬁling for the corresponding tax
year. For all ﬁrms selected for notiﬁcation, self-reported revenues are lower than third-
party reported revenues. Revenue discrepancies are large, both in absolute terms and as
a share of baseline self-reported revenue. The mean discrepancy is $307,000, $176,000
and $197,000 in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively.18 To analyze the relative size of the
discrepancy, we examine the distribution of (RT − b R)/(b R + 1). The median is 0.63.
There were 3,136 ﬁrms selected for the 2008 round, 2,221 for the 2009 round, and
2,636 for the 2010 round. Some ﬁrms were notiﬁed in more than one round. Our results are
robust to restricting the sample to ﬁrms that were only notiﬁed once, and all standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Not all ﬁrms selected for notiﬁcation actually
received them: approximately 7% of messages bounced due to invalid email addresses,
and it is quite likely that additional notiﬁcations were not received or read by the intended
recipients: email addresses may have been out of date or belonged to accountants or other
individuals that no longer work for the ﬁrm. We can therefore think of the notiﬁcation
sample as an intent-to-treat sample.
Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics for ﬁrms that submitted an amended
return after receiving the notiﬁcation (henceforth referred to as the “amending sample”).
We count a ﬁrm as amending if it ﬁled an amendment within three months after the
notiﬁcation.19 The share of amending ﬁrms in the notiﬁcation sample was 19% in the
17The fact that the median ﬁrm reports zero tax liability is not unique to Ecuador. In the US, for
example, an average of 65% of ﬁrms reported no tax liability (U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce,
2008). This ﬁgure reﬂects US held corporations that ﬁled the 1120 or 1120A tax form between 1998 and
2005.
18Conversations with SRI staﬀ conﬁrm that summary statistics for the 2008 round diﬀer from the 2009
and 2010 rounds because the selection criteria for receiving a notiﬁcation were changed somewhat for the
later years; summary statistics for the full sample are very similar across the three years.
19In 2009 and 2010, we observe the ﬁrm-speciﬁc notiﬁcation date. In 2008, as we discuss in Section 4.2,
182008 round, 11% in the 2009 round, and 16% in the 2010 round. Note that these ﬁgures
understate true response rates since, not all ﬁrms in the notiﬁcation sample actually
received the notiﬁcation. We cannot determine the share of ﬁrms that received and read
the notiﬁcation and made an active decision not to amend. Nevertheless, the observation
that a substantial share of ﬁrms chose not to amend is consistent with the case of limits
to enforcement discussed above. If the probability that a ﬁrm is detected and punished is
bounded below one, even conditional on a discrepancy, some ﬁrms may rationally choose
not to amend, taking the chance that the tax authority lacks the enforcement capacity to
follow up and force them to rectify the discrepancy. This is plausible in the Ecuadorian
context. Amending ﬁrms are somewhat smaller in terms of overall self-reported economic
activity than the full notiﬁcation sample, but median revenue discrepancies are quite
similar.
Given the magnitude of revenue discrepancies, notiﬁcations had the potential for large
eﬀects on total tax collection. For example, if all ﬁrms in the 2009 and 2010 rounds had
amended their returns to match the indicated third-party reported amount, aggregate
pre-tax revenue would have increased by approximately $391 and $522 million for the
2009 and 2010 ﬁscal years, respectively. If other line items were held constant, this would
imply a total increase in tax collection of approximately $194 million.20 Among just the
amending ﬁrms, implied increases in total tax collection are $39 million and $76 million
for 2009 and 2010 respectively. As we show below, actual tax revenue increases were
substantially smaller because ﬁrms oﬀset their revenue adjustments with adjustments to
reported costs.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
We are able to estimate the causal eﬀects of the notiﬁcations without an explicit control
group by comparing ﬁrms’ post-notiﬁcation and pre-notiﬁcation returns. The underlying
identifying assumption is that in the absence of the notiﬁcation, ﬁrms would not have
amended their returns. In this case, ﬁrms’ own pre-notiﬁcation reported values provide a
we impute the exact notiﬁcation start date. We assume that the 2008 notiﬁcations were made over a
one-month period following the start date, as in 2009 and 2010, and therefore consider amendments
ﬁled within a four-month window of the start date in 2008 to be as consistent as possible with the later
rounds. In practice, over half the ﬁrms that amended their return responded in less than one month and
our results are robust to choice of the post-notiﬁcation window.
20This is calculated as the tax rate (25%) multiplied by 85% of the additional declared revenue, since
15% of proﬁts are meant to be distributed to workers.
19valid counterfactual for post-notiﬁcation reports.
Indeed, the probability that ﬁrms spontaneously revise their returns for previous
years after such a long period absent a notiﬁcation is very low. Figure 1 plots amendment
rates for the notiﬁcation sample (right hand column) and for the rest of the full sample
(left hand column). The start of the notiﬁcation period is indicated by zero on the x-
axis. Amendment rates are very close to zero for both samples prior to the notiﬁcations.
There is a stark increase in the amendment rate for the notiﬁed sample following the start
date, but no such increase in the non-notiﬁed sample. Moreover, as we show below, the
types of adjustments made by non-notiﬁed ﬁrms that happen to revise their returns are
entirely diﬀerent from the amendments by notiﬁed ﬁrms. Correspondingly, the comparison
between the pre-notiﬁcation and post-notiﬁcation returns provides a causal estimate of
the discrepancy notiﬁcation on ﬁrms’ reporting behavior.
In the 2008 round, we know that notiﬁcations were sent in August and September of
2011 but we do not observe the ﬁrm-speciﬁc notiﬁcation dates. Based on the timing of
the discontinuity in the amendment rate, we impute the start date for the 2008 round as
August 11, 2011. In the subsequent analysis, we use the ﬁrm-speciﬁc notiﬁcation dates
for the 2009 and 2010 rounds and August 11, 2011 as the notiﬁcation date for the 2008
round. The pre-notiﬁcation reports are deﬁned by the last F101 ﬁling or amendment prior
to these dates. The post-notiﬁcation reports are deﬁned by the ﬁrst observed amendment
(if any) after the notiﬁcation during the post-notiﬁcation windows deﬁned in the preceding
section.
Firms were selected for notiﬁcation based in large part on their revenue discrepancies
and potential tax adjustment. The sample of ﬁrms selected for notiﬁcations is of course
not representative of the population of all ﬁrms in Ecuador. However, it is of particular
interest in the context of tax enforcement, since ﬁrms with large discrepancies are the
ones with the greatest potential for improved tax collection through third-party based
enforcement. Therefore, such enforcement strategies typically target this type of ﬁrm.
5 Results
Section 5.1 examines the pattern of revenue and cost discrepancies in the full sample in
2009 and 2010, the two years for which we have data on third-party reported revenues
and costs for all ﬁrms. Section 5.2 analyzes the impacts of the discrepancy notiﬁcations.
205.1 Evidence from the Full Sample of Firms
5.1.1 Revenue Discrepancies
Figure 2, Panel A plots the diﬀerence between the log of self-reported revenue and the
log of third-party reported revenue for ﬁrms with non-zero third-party reported revenue.
We add 1 in all log speciﬁcations to deal with zero self-reports.
As seen in Table 1, self-reported revenues are on average larger than third-party re-
ported revenues. At the same time, we also see 24% of ﬁlings with reported revenues
below third-party revenues. We observe a small degree of bunching around RT. However,
this bunching is not sharp: only 3.8% of ﬁlings have self-reported revenues that exactly
match the third-party estimate, and these are cases where RT is relatively small on aver-
age. As we will show, responses to the notiﬁcations result in bunching that is an order of
magnitude larger.
5.1.2 Cost Discrepancies
Figure 2, Panel B plots analogous diﬀerences in costs for ﬁrms with non-zero third-party
reported costs. We observe ﬁrms with declared costs both above and below the third-party
level and essentially no bunching at CT.21
One of the predictions of our model is that ﬁrms may under-report costs, counter to
the intuition that ﬁrms should wish to over-report costs in order to reduce tax liability.
We can look at this issue by analyzing whether ﬁrms report costs below the third-party
reported costs (b C < CT). This will provide a lower bound on the extent of true cost under-
reporting (b C < C) because third-party reporting for costs are even more incomplete than
third-party reporting for revenue. We ﬁnd that indeed, 23% of returns report costs that
are lower than third-party reported costs. Firms that declare zero tax liability may have
limited incentives to declare all costs, even though some degree of loss carryover is allowed.
However, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms under-report costs even when declaring positive tax liability:
9% of returns that under-report costs have positive tax liability and 5% of all returns that
have positive tax liability exhibit cost under-reporting.
The ﬁnding that ﬁrms under-report costs not only provides empirical support for our
21If we examine the full sample, including ﬁlings for which we do not have third-party information, we
see somewhat stronger bunching at both RT and CT (Appendix Figure A1). This additional bunching
reﬂects cases in which both the self-report and the third-party report are zero.
21conceptual framework but also has broader implications, for example for the eﬀectiveness
of the VAT. A key beneﬁt of the VAT is that it has self-enforcing properties as a result
of the conﬂicting incentives between buyers and sellers. Speciﬁcally, although sellers have
incentives to under-report the value of the transaction, buyers will want the transaction
to be reported fully in order to maximize their cost deductions. If, however, buyers are
not reporting all input costs, this self-enforcement mechanism can be undermined.
5.2 Response to Notiﬁcations
This section analyzes the responses to the discrepancy notiﬁcations. We examine how
ﬁrms adjust their reported revenues in response to the notiﬁcations and then consider
eﬀects on reported costs and overall tax liabilities. Our main speciﬁcations focus on the
sample of amending ﬁrms. We also present results for the full notiﬁcation sample. These
results are mechanically attenuated, since a ﬁrm in the notiﬁcation sample that did not
ﬁle an amendment will have no change to its reported revenues and costs by deﬁnition,
but the estimates are still highly statistically signiﬁcant.
5.2.1 Revenue Adjustments
As expected, we see strong bunching at the third-party revenue amount (RT) in re-
sponse to the notiﬁcations when ﬁrms are provided with a speciﬁc value for RT (2009
and 2010 rounds). The ﬁrst two graphs of Figure 3 show the diﬀerence between the log of
post-amendment self-reported revenue and the log of third-party reported revenue among
amending ﬁrms for the 2009 and 2010 rounds. There is very large bunching around zero,
indicating that ﬁrms are adjusting their revenues to match the provided estimate of RT.
Thirty-nine percent of ﬁrms in the 2009 round and 35% of ﬁrms in the 2010 round match
exactly, setting b R′ = RT. This contrasts notably with the full sample results (Figure 2)
in which we see minimal sharp bunching (3.8%).
Figure 4 shows these revenue responses in more detail, plotting the change in reported
revenue (revenue adjustment) against the pre-treatment revenue discrepancy. Panel A
shows results for amending ﬁrms. Approximately 15% of amending ﬁrms ﬁled an amend-
ment but did not change reported revenues or any other major variables. These ﬁrms are
essentially analogous to non-amending ﬁrms. We therefore deﬁne the sample of adjusting
ﬁrms as ﬁrms which made any positive adjustment to revenue following the notiﬁcations
22(Panel B).
The ﬁrst two graphs of Figure 4, Panel B present the results for adjusting ﬁrms for
the 2009 and 2010 rounds. Firms tend to locate closely along the 45-degree line, matching
the third-party estimate. This shows that the observed bunching around zero in Figure 3
is not limited to small ﬁrms: even ﬁrms with very large revenue discrepancies match the
third-party amount in their amended returns.22 To the extent that there is incompleteness
or noise in the SRI’s measure of RT, these results indicate that ﬁrms match the estimate
provided to them.
Next, we can test whether the bunching is a direct result of the information provided
in the notiﬁcations by comparing these ﬁndings to the 2008 round. For 2008, ﬁrms were
only told that their reported revenues were below third-party reported amounts but were
not given an actual value of RT. As expected, we observe much less bunching, and only
6% of ﬁrms match RT exactly (Figure 3). This exact matching in the 2008 round could
reﬂect some ﬁrms seeking out and obtaining additional information about their revenue
discrepancies from the SRI. Firms with larger revenue discrepancies make larger revenue
adjustments on average, but there is much higher variance than in the 2009 and 2010
rounds (Figure 4). In addition, the ﬁtted line in Panel B lies clearly below the 45-degree
line: ﬁrms in the 2008 round adjust revenues by only 36 cents for every dollar of actual
revenue discrepancy estimated by the SRI.
Comparing the 2008 round with the 2009 and 2010 rounds yields several implications.
First, it is clear that ﬁrms are adjusting their revenues speciﬁcally in response to the
information provided in the notiﬁcations rather than just the receipt of a notiﬁcation
from the tax authority itself. Second, the results provide strong evidence of misreporting
both before and after the notiﬁcations. The 2008 adjustments indicate that ﬁrms have
substantial scope for upward revision in reported revenues. Since RT is a lower bound
on true revenues, this indicates that ﬁrms in all rounds are likely to be under-reporting
revenues even in the post-notiﬁcation ﬁlings. Finally, the fact that ﬁrms make smaller
adjustments when not provided the speciﬁc amount of RT is consistent with the idea that
ﬁrms will optimally try to minimize reported revenues (b R) and also suggests that they
are underestimating the ability of the tax authority to collect third-party information.
The results are not consistent with an alternative in which the notiﬁcations simply
22The displayed data points are restricted to the range zero to one million, but the ﬁtted line and
conﬁdence interval reﬂect the unrestricted sample.
23prompt ﬁrms to review their books and correct inadvertent omissions in reported revenues:
28% of ﬁrms in the notiﬁcation sample and 38% of the adjusting sample reported zero
revenues on their initial returns. In Ecuador, as in some other countries, there are strong
incentives for registered ﬁrms to continue to ﬁle annual returns even if they truly had no
economic activity in a given year.23 Therefore, the ﬁling of a return with zero reports does
not raise a red ﬂag for the tax authority in and of itself. Since it is unlikely for ﬁrms to
“forget” that they had any economic activity, lazy reporting on initial ﬁlings alone cannot
explain the observed patterns of under-reporting and adjustment.
Figures 3 and 4 display revenue discrepancies and adjustments in absolute terms
without making adjustments for ﬁrm size. Appendix Figure A2 shows results that adjust
for ﬁrm size by scaling both axes by baseline reported revenue. If anything, observed
matching is stronger.
Table 3 presents the results in regression form along with robustness tests. Panel A
shows the response in reported revenue in the pooled 2009 and 2010 rounds. Standard
errors are clustered by ﬁrm, and all results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The baseline regression coeﬃcient corresponds to the ﬁtted line in Figure 4, Panel B. This
coeﬃcient is 0.927, indicating that adjusting ﬁrms increase their reported revenues by 93
cents for every dollar of indicated third-party revenue.
This estimate is robust to a variety of speciﬁcation adjustments. Restricting the
sample to ﬁrms notiﬁed in only one round, the coeﬃcient is 1.016. The eﬀects are not
driven by ﬁrms responding to large revenue discrepancies: the coeﬃcients are almost
identical when we restrict the sample to ﬁrms with revenue discrepancies below $1,000,000
or below $250,000, conﬁrming that the observed eﬀects hold throughout the distribution.
A very small number of ﬁrms make negative revenue adjustments; including these ﬁrms
has a negligible eﬀect on the estimated coeﬃcient (0.926). Our baseline speciﬁcation uses
the last F101 ﬁling prior to the notiﬁcations as our baseline measure of reported revenue.
In some cases, the measure of baseline revenue provided to ﬁrms on the letters from the
SRI diﬀers slightly. Using the letter measure in our calculation of revenue adjustments
again makes little diﬀerence to the results (0.932). Finally, as mentioned above, the
measure of RT provided to ﬁrms is derived from the third-party reported data but was
hand checked by SRI staﬀ and adjusted in some cases. Our results are robust to excluding
cases where such adjustments were made (1.111).
23Inactive ﬁrms face ﬁnes if they fail to submit tax returns until the ﬁrm is legally closed, a process
which is costly and can take several years.
245.2.2 Cost Adjustments
We now demonstrate that ﬁrms make substantial oﬀsetting adjustments to these changes
in reported revenues by changing reported costs. Figure 5 plots the change in reported
costs against the change in reported revenue for adjusting ﬁrms. In all three rounds, ﬁrms
locate almost exactly along the 45-degree line, indicating that they closely match increases
in reported revenues with increases in reported costs. This behavior holds along the entire
distribution of changes in reported revenue, even when revenue adjustments are in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Over 15% of ﬁrms match their cost adjustments to their
revenue adjustments within $100, with about half of these matching exactly. Almost 30%
of ﬁrms match within $1,000. The median revenue discrepancy in the notiﬁcation sample
is $50,000.
Although we observe diﬀerences in revenue adjustments depending on whether or not
ﬁrms are provided a speciﬁc value of RT, cost adjustments match revenue adjustments
closely in all three rounds. This indicates that ﬁrms are choosing their level of reported
costs in a way that targets their optimized levels of reported revenues. Table 3 Panel B
presents corresponding regression analyses for the pooled 2008-2010 rounds. The baseline
regression coeﬃcient corresponds to the ﬁtted line in Figure 5. This coeﬃcient is 0.962,
indicating that adjusting ﬁrms increase their reported costs by 96 cents on average for
every dollar of revenue adjustment. This result is stable across all of the same robustness
checks as in Panel A, described in Section 5.2.1, and robust to scaling adjustments by
baseline reported revenues (see Appendix Figure A3).
These ﬁndings imply that the use of third-party information had little eﬀect on tax
evasion (the gap between true and reported proﬁts). A natural question is why the tax
authority would not immediately pursue these ﬁrms. While we do not have information
on actions taken against speciﬁc ﬁrms, conversations with SRI staﬀ indicate that they
are indeed in the process of follow-up control eﬀorts. However, such eﬀorts suﬀer from
the exact problem third-party cross-checks are meant to mitigate. Following up with
ﬁrms would require in-person audits, which are time consuming and very costly. The
main advantage of third-party reporting is that, unlike audits, it is meant to provide a
simple, low-cost mechanism to enforce tax collection. The central challenge when third-
party reporting of costs is partial is that the tax authority cannot deﬁnitively distinguish
between legitimate additional reported costs and false costs without a full audit. This
inability to diﬀerentiate real from fake costs using ﬁrm reports alone is in fact what allows
25ﬁrms ﬂexibility in adjusting their costs and puts limits on the power of enforcement based
solely on information from third-party reporting of revenue.
While our results on cost under-reporting suggest that there is some scope for new
reporting of legitimate costs, we also ﬁnd suggestive evidence that ﬁrms are including
fake costs in their amendments. In particular, ﬁrms disproportionately choose cost ad-
justments on line items that would be diﬃcult for the tax authority to verify in the event
of a full audit. Ecuadorian ﬁrms are required to distinguish between production costs
(“costos”) and administrative costs (“gastos”), with many cost line items including both
a “costo”and “gasto”component. As conﬁrmed by Ecuadorian tax oﬃcials, the provision
and value of many administrative costs, such as legal or consulting services, are more
diﬃcult to verify than physical inputs to production.
Within each line item category, adjustments to gastos are more frequent than adjust-
ments to costos. The most frequent cost adjustment is on “Other Administrative Costs,”
a line item that is particularly hard to verify because it may contain miscellaneous pur-
chases including transactions with the informal sector. Fifty percent of adjusting ﬁrms
report zero “Other Administrative Costs” before the amendment, while only 25 percent
report zero after the amendment. We ﬁnd that the ratio of total gastos (summed across
adjusting ﬁrms) to total costs is higher on the amendments than on pre-notiﬁcation re-
turns, and the ratio of “Other Administrative Costs” is 6.5% on the amended portion of
the return, compared to 3.8% on the initial ﬁlings. Taken together, these results suggest
that ﬁrms are systematically increasing reported costs on line items that are diﬃcult for
the tax authority to verify relative to their pre-notiﬁcation returns.
To the extent that some additional costs are legitimate, ﬁrms could potentially be
responding to the notiﬁcations by bringing entire transactions (revenues together with
their associated costs) on the books (Kopczuk, 2012). We next look at whether such
behavior could fully explain the adjustments we observe in the data. As seen above,
many ﬁrms match their cost adjustments extremely closely to their revenue adjustments.
For example, over 15% of adjusting ﬁrms match their cost adjustments to their revenue
adjustments within $100, which would only be consistent with bringing zero proﬁt trans-
actions on the books. In addition, if ﬁrms were responding to the notiﬁcations only by
bringing entire transactions on the books, we would expect to see a positive correlation
between ﬁrms’ reported proﬁt rates prior to the notiﬁcations and the reported proﬁt rate
on the amended portion of the return. We ﬁnd no such correlation: among all adjusting
ﬁrms, the correlation coeﬃcient between the pre-notiﬁcation proﬁt rate and proﬁt rate on
26the amendment is -0.01. Among adjusters with positive pre-notiﬁcation reported proﬁts,
the correlation is actually negative. This indicates that ﬁrms seem to be choosing new
optimal levels of reported costs based on their new levels of reported revenue.
5.2.3 Eﬀects on Tax Revenue
Given the results above, it is not surprising that overall eﬀects on tax collection are
modest. Figure 6 plots a histogram of changes in the log of tax liability for adjusting
ﬁrms. We see a large spike around zero, consistent with ﬁrms having oﬀset much of their
revenue adjustments with corresponding cost adjustments.
Table 4 presents regressions of revenue adjustments, cost adjustments, and resulting
changes in tax liability on our indicator for post-notiﬁcation for the amending sample
(Panel A) and the full notiﬁcation sample (Panel B). The coeﬃcient on ‘post’ indicates
the diﬀerence in declared amounts before and after the notiﬁcations. If a ﬁrm made no
amendment in the relevant post-notiﬁcation window, its post-notiﬁcation values are the
same as its pre-notiﬁcation values. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level, and all
results are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Panel A shows that amending ﬁrms on average increased their reported revenues by
$86,000 and costs by $80,000, resulting in an average increase in tax liability of $1,900.
This increase in tax liability is an order of magnitude smaller than it would have been had
ﬁrms adjusted only revenues. We see similar patterns in the full notiﬁcation sample (Panel
B). These eﬀects are mechanically attenuated by the amendment rate, since non-amender
ﬁrms had zero adjustments by deﬁnition. However, even in this sample, the observed
eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Our estimates imply that the total incremental tax
collection attributable to the notiﬁcations was approximately $2 million.
Finally, we return to our initial identifying assumption, which is that the pre-post
diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ reports can be taken as a causal eﬀect of the notiﬁcations. Table 5
shows a placebo test in which we simulate treatment eﬀects for non-notiﬁed ﬁrms, as-
suming that these ﬁrms had been notiﬁed on the ﬁrst day of the notiﬁcation period in
each year. Panel A includes all non-notiﬁed ﬁrms and Panel B includes non-notiﬁed ﬁrms
that happened to make an amendment during the relevant period. There are no signiﬁ-
cant changes in revenues, costs, or tax liabilities, and the point estimates for revenue and
cost adjustments are of opposite sign. This provides strong support for our identifying
assumption.
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porting. While the notiﬁcations did cause ﬁrms to adjust their reported revenues to
match third-party reported amounts, ﬁrms oﬀset much of this adjustment by increases
in reported costs. These results cannot be driven by real economic responses, since all
transactions for the relevant tax returns were made well prior to the notiﬁcations. The
pattern of responses provides strong evidence of misreporting by ﬁrms, both before and
after the notiﬁcations.
Our empirical ﬁndings – both the observed cross-sectional patterns and the responses
to the notiﬁcations – can be reconciled in our conceptual framework.24 Independently
of the underlying model, our results have important implications, which we believe are
broadly generalizable to many low income countries. First, there is substantial misreport-
ing of both ﬁrm revenues and costs, and evading ﬁrms may under-report true costs in
addition to revenues. Second, the eﬀectiveness of third-party reporting depends on other
features of the enforcement environment. The notiﬁcations studied here are precisely the
type of policy any government would pursue in order to utilize third-party information for
enforcement: cross-check taxpayer reports, detect discrepancies, and request taxpayers to
revise their ﬁlings accordingly. However, the eﬀect of such policies on revenue collection
may be constrained by other aspects of tax administration, such as low detection capac-
ity or low enforcement capacity conditional on detection. These limitations could result
from limited governmental resources, corruption, or weak legal environments, common
concerns in many developing economies.
5.3 Taxpayer Reports in Subsequent Tax Filings
The above analyses examine how ﬁrms respond to ex post notiﬁcations of detected dis-
crepancies. As taxpayers update their beliefs about the information available to the tax
authority, we would expect them to adjust their ex ante behavior for subsequent tax years.
Most individuals in the United States, for example, report their W2 income accurately
because they know that discrepancies will be detected and prosecuted with near certainty.
In our context, we might expect notiﬁed ﬁrms to report both higher revenues and
costs on post-notiﬁcation returns. An empirical challenge is constructing an appropri-
24In the context of the model, the large cost oﬀsets we observe are consistent with a low gradient of
the detection probability with respect to the reported proﬁt rate. The failure of some ﬁrms to amend in
response to the notiﬁcations reﬂects the fact that the eﬀective detection probability (the probability that
the ﬁrm is both caught and punished) is less than one, even conditional on a revenue discrepancy.
28ate counterfactual for notiﬁed ﬁrms’ subsequent returns. Deﬁning a control group using
propensity score matching is not suitable for this context: in cases in which ﬁrms with
large revenue discrepancies were excluded from being notiﬁed, this generally occurred for
a speciﬁc reason, such as an existing ongoing investigation by the SRI. We therefore do
not have an ideal control group for notiﬁed ﬁrms.
The best we can do to shed some light on this question is to exploit a source of
variation from the design of the 2008 notiﬁcations. The SRI had initially selected a larger
group of ﬁrms for notiﬁcation, but some ﬁrms in this sample were not notiﬁed due to
technology resource constraints. We can thus use the selected-but-not-notiﬁed ﬁrms as
a control group for notiﬁed ﬁrms. This control group is imperfect: the SRI staﬀ used
discretion in prioritizing ﬁrms for notiﬁcation within the selected sample. We therefore
stress that these results can provide only suggestive evidence about subsequent responses.
The 2008 notiﬁcations were sent in the summer of 2011 and could potentially inﬂuence
both ﬁrms’ economic decisions in the latter portion of the year and reporting choices in
their 2011 tax return (due in April 2012). Hence, subsequent responses to the 2008
notiﬁcations will be captured by diﬀerences in the 2011 tax returns between treatment
and control groups. We restrict the sample to ﬁrms that were selected for notiﬁcation for
the 2008 round only, resulting in 2,046 and 1,035 ﬁrms in treatment and control groups,
respectively.
Appendix Figures A4 and A5 plot mean revenues and costs for treatment and control
groups for the 2008-2011 tax years. We see quite large diﬀerences in levels but pre-trends
are broadly similar. We observe a divergence in the 2011 tax year, with the treatment
group reporting both higher revenues and higher costs than the control group. However,
there are some increases, though smaller, in the 2010 tax year as well. Appendix Table A1
shows regressions of revenues, costs, and tax liability on an indicator for 2011 interacted
with an indicator for treatment with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The treatment group indeed has
signiﬁcantly higher reported revenues and costs than the control group. A placebo test
using reports for the 2010 tax year results in insigniﬁcant results; the point estimates are
approximately one-third the size of the 2011 eﬀects (unreported).
These results provide some suggestive evidence that ﬁrms do in fact adjust their
behavior subsequent to the notiﬁcations as we would expect. However, given the nature
of the source of variation, we cannot rule out the possibility of diﬀerent underlying trends
between treatment and control groups. Gaining a better understanding of how taxpayers
29respond to updated perceptions about the information and enforcement capacity of the
tax authority would be an interesting avenue for future research.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact and potential limitations of tax enforcement based on
third-party information. When ﬁrms are notiﬁed by the tax authority about detected
revenue discrepancies, they amend their returns and increase reported revenues, closely
matching the amount indicated when it is provided. However, they oﬀset much of this
higher declared revenue by an increase in declared costs, resulting in only small changes
in their reported proﬁts, implied tax evasion, and corresponding corporate tax liabilities.
This is true even when adjustments are in the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars.
This highlights the importance of taking possible oﬀsetting adjustments into account when
examining the eﬀectiveness of tax enforcement measures. We also document substantial
misreporting in the universe of ﬁrms in Ecuador, using third-party information on revenues
and costs. Notably, we ﬁnd evidence that some ﬁrms under-report not only revenues but
also costs, even when they have positive tax liability. These empirical ﬁndings can be
reconciled in a simple model of third-party reporting in which the detection probability
depends on the ﬁrm’s reported proﬁt rate.
Our results have a number of implications for tax enforcement and public ﬁnance
in developing countries. First, these results indicate limits to the power of enforcement
policies based on third-party information when such information is partial. In particular,
the collection of third-party information may have diﬀerent levels of eﬀectiveness depend-
ing on the amount of information available on other margins: as in the O-ring theory of
economic development (Kremer, 1993), the weakest link may play a preponderant role for
tax collection. Third-party reporting is therefore likely to be most eﬀective when there
are relatively few margins that are not third-party reported and when the tax authority
can audit these margins eﬀectively. In many developing countries, however, third-party
reporting is highly incomplete and there are severe limits to the eﬀectiveness of traditional
auditing. In these types of environments, third-party reporting may not be a silver bullet
in solving the problem of improving state ﬁscal capacity.
Second, the fact that some ﬁrms appear to under-report their costs in addition to
under-reporting revenues has several important implications. Cost under-reporting can
30undermine certain types of compliance incentives. For example, one of the main attractive
features of the VAT is that it has self-enforcing properties if buyers want to fully declare
costs to maximize their input deductions. However, if buyers have incentives to under-
report true costs, opportunities for evasion and collusion in the VAT can arise. In addition,
one of the costs of informality – limited ability to trade with the formal sector – may
be reduced. When ﬁrms want to report all their input costs, they may avoid informal
suppliers who cannot provide a receipt (De Paula and Scheinkman, 2010). If ﬁrms are
not fully maximizing their reported costs, this barrier is diminished.
Since cost under-reporting can undermine certain forms of cross-ﬁrm compliance
incentives, enforcement that increases cost reporting can lead to positive spillovers.25 If
ﬁrms were required to accompany additional cost deductions with information about the
providers of these input costs, enforcement based on third-party reported information can
in turn generate more such information. Gaining a better understanding of the extent of
such spillover eﬀects is an important avenue for future research.
Third, our ﬁndings suggest ways in which governments should take limits to infor-
mation and enforcement capacity into account when designing tax policy. In particular,
the optimal tax base will depend on the degree of available third-party information on the
base as a whole. For example, if ﬁrms are able to oﬀset reported revenues with reported
costs, it may be optimal to limit allowable cost deductions to those that are easy to verify.
Our empirical ﬁndings are complementary with Best et al. (forthcoming), who show that
governments may prefer productively-ineﬃcient turnover taxes to proﬁt taxes when costs
are easier to evade.
Finally, our results suggest that enforcement strategies based on third-party reported
information are complementary to the eﬀectiveness of the tax authority’s traditional au-
diting resources. While the immediate impact of enforcement strategies based on third-
party information may be reduced through oﬀsetting behavior, misreporting is channeled
onto a smaller number of margins. This allows tax authorities to focus their (scarce)
auditing resources on the margins that are more diﬃcult to monitor through third-party
information, rather than having to manually audit all margins. As the scope of trans-
actions covered by third-party information grows, manual auditing can be focused on an
increasingly narrow set of hard-to-monitor transactions. However, given the “weakest
link” dynamic, it remains crucial to audit transactions that are hardest to monitor by
25Such spillovers are consistent with the ﬁndings in Pomeranz (2013).
31third-party information. Despite the growth of computer-based monitoring methods us-
ing cross-checks of third-party information, strengthening the auditing and enforcement
capacity of developing country governments therefore still remains of crucial importance
for eﬀective tax collection.
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35Tables and Figures
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, All Firms, 2008-2010
Revenue ($000) 1,576
(42,169)
[46]
Costs ($000) 1,475
(41,560)
[46]
Tax liability ($000) 23
(626)
[0]
For 2009-2010 only
Reported revenue − third-party revenue ($000) 536
(13,505)
[5]
Reported costs − third-party costs ($000) 678
(26,861)
[24]
% of ﬁrms with positive third-party revenue 72%
% of ﬁrms with positive third-party costs 90%
Observations 192,882
Number of ﬁrms 87,076
Notes: Group means are reported along with standard deviations in
parentheses and medians in brackets. All monetary ﬁgures in USD.
36Table 2
Descriptive Statistics By Year, Notiﬁed and Amending Firms
Fiscal Year
2008 2009 2010
Panel A: Notiﬁed Firms
Revenue ($000) 1,542 624 592
(6,118) (1,260) (1,237)
[136] [120] [103]
Costs ($000) 1,439 583 552.0
(5,398) (1,170) (1,153)
[129] [113] [96]
Tax liability ($000) 26 11 10
(171) (31.0) (27.6)
[1] [1] [1]
Reported revenue − third-party revenue ($000) -307 -176 -197
(1,741) (312) (388)
[-42] [-64] [-66]
Observations 3,136 2,221 2,636
Number of ﬁrms with − 159 163
invalid email addresses
Panel B: Amending Firms
Revenue ($000) 1,402 370 417
(4,367) (944) (959)
[179] [56] [34]
Costs ($000) 1,331 352 397
(4,172) (887) (923)
[163] [62] [33]
Tax liability ($000) 18 5 5
(70) (17) (13)
[1] [0] [0]
Reported revenue − third-party revenue ($000) -217 -151 -173
(806) (299) (333)
[-40] [-55] [-63]
Observations 596 249 421
Start of notiﬁcation period August 11, 2011 March 26, 2012 March 26, 2012
End of notiﬁcation period − April 20, 2012 April 20, 2012
Notes: Group means are reported along with standard deviations in parentheses and medians in brackets. Notiﬁed
ﬁrms are deﬁned as those to whom the SRI sent an email notiﬁcation (including those for whom the email bounced
back). Amending ﬁrms are deﬁned as those who ﬁled an amended return in the post-notiﬁcation window (see text for
details). All monetary ﬁgures in USD.
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Treatment Eﬀects and Robustness Tests for Adjusting Firms:
Revenue and Cost Matching
Speciﬁcation: Coeﬃcient (SE) N R2
Panel A: Regressing Revenue Adjustment on
Revenue Discrepancy (2009-2010)
Baseline (Corresponds to Figure 4B) 0.927*** (0.105) 570 0.728
Robustness Tests
Only ﬁrms notiﬁed in no more than one round 1.016*** (0.094) 410 0.798
Censoring to revenue discrepancies < $1,000,000 0.900*** (0.112) 556 0.623
Censoring to revenue discrepancies < $250,000 0.917*** (0.052) 495 0.657
Including negative revenue adjustments 0.926*** (0.105) 580 0.285
SRI letter measure of baseline b R 0.932*** (0.098) 571 0.744
Using only unadjusted variation in RT 1.111*** (0.151) 249 0.811
Panel B: Regressing Cost Adjustment on
Revenue Adjustment (2008-2010)
Baseline (Corresponds to Figure 5) 0.962*** (0.016) 979 0.982
Robustness Tests
Only ﬁrms notiﬁed in no more than one round 0.960*** (0.017) 737 0.983
Censoring to revenue adjustments < $1,000,000 0.975*** (0.029) 960 0.882
Censoring to revenue adjustments < $250,000 0.897*** (0.042) 886 0.677
Including negative revenue adjustments 0.974*** (0.015) 1,016 0.988
SRI letter measure of baseline b R 0.942*** (0.022) 1,054 0.962
Notes: Panel A shows linear regressions of revenue adjustments on revenue discrepancies for adjusting
ﬁrms in 2009 and 2010. Panel B shows linear regressions of cost adjustments on revenue adjustments
for adjusting ﬁrms in 2008-2010. All monetary ﬁgures in USD. Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in
parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
38Table 4
Treatment Eﬀects on Overall Revenues, Costs, and Tax Liabilities, 2008-2010
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue Costs Tax
Liability
Panel A: Amending Firms
Post 86,203*** 80,155*** 1,857***
(15,346) (15,037) (222)
Constant 871,286*** 827,971*** 11,237***
(7,673) (7,518) (111)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.996 0.995 0.996
Observations 2,532 2,532 2,532
Number of ﬁrms 1,175 1,175 1,175
Panel B: Notiﬁed Firms
Post 13,653*** 12,695*** 294***
(2,363) (2,310) (35)
Constant 973,367*** 908,564*** 16,224***
(1,181) (1,155) (17)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.998 0.998 0.998
Observations 15,986 15,986 15,986
Number of ﬁrms 6,532 6,532 6,532
Notes: Dependent variables are in levels. All monetary ﬁgures in USD.
Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance:
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
39Table 5
Placebo Tests: Simulated Treatment Eﬀects for Non-Notiﬁed Firms, 2008-2010
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue Costs Tax
Liability
Panel A: All Non-Notiﬁed Firms
Post 1,820 -1,524 546
(1,616) (2,417) (598)
Constant 1,488,306*** 1,393,331*** 22,099***
(811) (1,214) (299)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.848 0.836 0.856
Observations 400,128 400,128 401,482
Number of ﬁrms 90,264 90,264 90,264
Panel B: Amending Non-Notiﬁed Firms
Post 304,909 -225,026 86,403
(308,155) (461,319) (114,806)
Constant 9,535,873*** 9,370,717*** 36,668***
(158,031) (236,578) (58,876)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 1.000 0.999 0.513
Observations 2,611 2,611 2,611
Number of ﬁrms 1,230 1,230 1,230
Notes: Linear regressions for non-notiﬁed ﬁrms, supposing that they had been notiﬁed on the
ﬁrst day of the notiﬁcation period for each year. Panel A displays all non-notiﬁed ﬁrms, Panel
B non-notiﬁed ﬁrms that happened to amend during the relevant period. All monetary ﬁgures
in USD. Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance: ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Notes: The left Column plots amendment rates for the universe of non-notiﬁed ﬁrms before and after
the start of the intervention. The right Column does the same for notiﬁed ﬁrms. Start date imputed for
2008 (see text for details).
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Revenue and Cost Discrepancies, All Firms with Positive Third-Party Information
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Notes: Results are shown for the sample of 59,937 active ﬁrms for which there are positive third-party
revenues in Panel A and the sample of 74,519 active ﬁrms for which there are positive third-party costs
in Panel B. Both panels show data for 2009-2010, the years for which complete third-party information is
available. Results are similar if histograms are separated by year. Bins are of size 0.01, and the top and
bottom 1% of the sample are omitted when calculating bin heights for computational purposes. 3.8% of
reports match revenues exactly; 0.1% match costs exactly.
42Figure 3
Revenue Adjustments among Amending Firms
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Notes: Bins are of size 0.01, and the top and bottom 1% of the sample are omitted when calculating bin heights for computational purposes.
39% of ﬁrms match exactly in 2009; 35% matched exactly in 2010; 6% matched exactly in 2008.
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Revenue Matching
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Notes: The dashed line indicates a 45-degree line. Also shown is a ﬁtted line, and a 95% conﬁdence interval for the ﬁtted line. Axes are restricted
to show zero to one million but the ﬁtted line and conﬁdence interval reﬂect the unrestricted sample. Axes are in thousands of USD. Slopes are
as follows: 0.916 for the 2009 round, 0.930 for the 2010 round, and 0.355 for the 2008 round.
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Cost Matching
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Notes: The dashed line indicates a 45-degree line. Also shown is a ﬁtted line, and a 95% conﬁdence interval for the ﬁtted line. Axes are restricted
to show zero to one million but the ﬁtted line and conﬁdence interval reﬂect the unrestricted sample. Axes are in thousands of USD. Slopes are
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Changes in Taxes Among Adjusting Firms
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Notes: Histograms of the change in log(tax liability +1) between pre- and post-notiﬁcation for amending ﬁrms that made a positive revenue
adjustment. Bins are of size 0.01, and the bottom 1% of the sample is omitted when calculating bin heights for computational reasons.
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6Appendix
Appendix A1: Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1
Treatment Eﬀects in Subsequent Filings
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue Costs Tax
Liability
Treated × Post 539,247*** 468,812** 10,326***
(120,942) (118,065) (3,697)
Post 225,061*** 225,252*** 2,723*
(56,766) (59,756) (1,600)
Constant 1,859,045*** 1,733,198*** 30,237***
(17,656) (16,918) (549)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.955 0.950 0.864
Observations 11,675 11,675 11,675
Number of ﬁrms 3,081 3,081 3,081
Notes: Linear regressions for ﬁrms selected to be notiﬁed in the
2008 round. Treated ﬁrms are those that were actually notiﬁed;
control ﬁrms are those that were not notiﬁed due to time constraints.
All monetary ﬁgures in USD. Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in
parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <
0.1.
47Figure A1
Revenue and Cost Discrepancies, All Firms
(Includes Filings with Zero Third-Party Reports)
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Notes: Results are shown for the entire sample of 82,774 active ﬁrms. Both panels show data for 2009-
2010, since third-party costs are not available for 2008. Results are similar if histograms are separated by
year. Bins are of size 0.01, and the top and bottom 1% of the sample are omitted when calculating bin
heights for computational reasons. 21.0% of reports match revenues exactly; 2.5% match costs exactly.
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Revenue Matching, Scaled by Baseline Reported Revenues
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Notes: Variables are scaled by dividing by (pre-notiﬁcation reported revenue +1). The dashed line indicates a 45-degree line. Also shown is a
ﬁtted line, and a 95% conﬁdence interval for the ﬁtted line. Axes are in thousands of USD and are restricted to show zero to 200 thousand, but
the ﬁtted line and conﬁdence interval reﬂect the unrestricted sample. Slopes are as follows: 1.017 for the 2009 round, 1.067 for the 2010 round,
and 0.620 for the 2008 round.
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Cost Matching, Scaled by Baseline Reported Revenues
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Notes: Variables are scaled by dividing both the variables on the y and x-axis by (pre-notiﬁcation reported revenue +1). The dashed line
indicates a 45-degree line. Also shown is a ﬁtted line, and a 95% conﬁdence interval for the ﬁtted line. Axes are in thousands of USD and are
restricted to show zero to 200 thousand but the ﬁtted line and conﬁdence interval reﬂect the unrestricted sample. Slopes are as follows: 1.035
for the 2009 round, 1.003 for the 2010 round, and 0.949 for the 2008 round.
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0Figure A4
Mean Reported Revenues in Subsequent Filings
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Notes: Lines show mean reported revenues by year for treatment ﬁrms (above) and control (below) ﬁrms.
Treatment ﬁrms are those notiﬁed in the 2008 round. Control ﬁrms are those selected to be notiﬁed in
the 2008 round but not actually notiﬁed due to time constraints.
51Figure A5
Mean Reported Costs in Subsequent Filings
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Notes: Lines show mean reported costs by year for treatment ﬁrms (above) and control (below) ﬁrms.
Treatment ﬁrms are those notiﬁed in the 2008 round. Control ﬁrms are those selected to be notiﬁed in
the 2008 round but not actually notiﬁed due to time constraints.
52Appendix A2: Policy Intervention Message: Year 2008
SERVICIO DE RENTAS INTERNAS
DEPARTAMENTO DE GESTI´ ON TRIBUTARIA
Quito, 5 de septiembre del 2011
Se˜ nor (a) xxxxxx
Gerente General de xxxxx
El Art. 67 del C´ odigo Tributario y el segundo art´ ıculo de la Ley de Creaci´ on del Servicio
de Rentas Internas otorgan a esta Administraci´ on Tributaria la facultad para efectuar la
determinaci´ on, recaudaci´ on y control de los tributos internos del Estado.
Esta Administraci´ on Tributaria, luego de revisar las bases de datos con las que cuenta,
ha identiﬁcado valores atribuibles a ingresos de la sociedad a la que usted representa
superiores al monto registrado en la declaraci´ on de impuesto a la renta correspondiente al
ejercicio ﬁscal 2008.
De conformidad a lo establecido por los art´ ıculos 89 del C´ odigo Tributario y 101 de la Ley
de R´ egimen Tributario, las declaraciones de impuestos efectuadas por los sujetos pasivos
tienen el car´ acter de deﬁnitivas y vinculantes, por lo que hacen responsable al declarante
y, en su caso, al contador que ﬁrme la declaraci´ on, por la exactitud y veracidad de los
datos que contenga; sin embargo el sujeto pasivo, a petici´ on expresa del Servicio de
Rentas Internas podr´ a, dentro de los seis a˜ nos siguientes a la fecha de presentaci´ on de la
declaraci´ on original, rectiﬁcar en una declaraci´ on sustitutiva, los rubros requeridos por la
Administraci´ on Tributaria.
El Art. 19 de la Ley de R´ egimen Tributario Interno y el art´ ıculo 37 de su reglamento,
establecen que todas las sociedades est´ an obligadas a llevar contabilidad y declarar el
impuesto en base a los resultados que arroje la misma. Adicionalmente los libros conta-
bles tienen que estar debidamente respaldados por los correspondientes comprobantes de
venta y dem´ as documentos pertinentes, documentaci´ on toda que puede ser requerida en
cualquier momento por la Administraci´ on Tributaria para ﬁnes de control.
En atenci´ on a los antecedentes y a las normas legales citadas, esta Administraci´ on le
53solicita presente la declaraci´ on sustitutiva correspondiente al impuesto a la renta del
ejercicio ﬁscal 2008 v´ ıa Internet, dentro de los diez (10) d´ ıas h´ abiles posteriores a la
presente comunicaci´ on.
Adicionalmente le recordamos que en la declaraci´ on del impuesto a la renta del a˜ no 2008,
debe registrar el valor del anticipo calculado de impuesto a la renta con cargo al ejercicio
ﬁscal 2009, de conformidad al art´ ıculo 41 de la Ley de R´ egimen Tributario Interno.
A la vez se le informa que de ser el caso, el sujeto pasivo, deber´ a calcular el impuesto,
inter´ es y multa a pagar considerando los pagos previos efectuados, conforme la normativa
tributaria vigente respecto a la imputaci´ on al pago.
Finalmente, se advierte al sujeto pasivo que la Administraci´ on Tributaria se reserva el
derecho de veriﬁcar oportunamente la informaci´ on contenida en las declaraciones de im-
puestos, que en el caso de que el sujeto activo ejerza su facultad determinadora proceder´ a
a cobrar un recargo del veinte por ciento (20%) calculado en base al impuesto determi-
nado, y que en caso de comprobar la existencia de actos de ocultaci´ on o falsedad, por los
que se haya dejado de pagar en todo o en parte los tributos debidos, en provecho propio
o de un tercero, tales hechos se considerar´ an defraudaci´ on ﬁscal, conforme lo se˜ nala el
art´ ıculo 342 del C´ odigo Tributario y cuyas sanciones se especiﬁcan en el Libro Cuarto del
mismo cuerpo legal que se reﬁere al Il´ ıcito Tributario.
En caso de requerir mayor informaci´ on sobre la presente comunicaci´ on puede acercarse a
las oﬁcinas del Departamento de Gesti´ on Tributaria, ubicadas a nivel nacional.
El env´ ıo de este correo es autom´ atico, por favor no lo responda.
Atentamente,
Servicio de Rentas Internas
Nota: Ahora es m´ as f´ acil cumplir con sus obligaciones tributarias, utilizando nuestro ser-
vicio gratuito de declaraciones y anexos por internet, que le permitir´ a presentar ´ agilmente
la informaci´ on. Obtenga su clave de seguridad y el programa en cualquiera de las oﬁcinas
del Servicio de Rentas Internas a nivel nacional.
54Appendix A3: Policy Intervention Message: Years 2009 - 2010
SERVICIO DE RENTAS INTERNAS
DEPARTAMENTO DE GESTI´ ON TRIBUTARIA
Quito, a viernes, 20 de abril de 2012
Se˜ nor (a) xx
Representante Legal de xx
El Art. 67 del C´ odigo Tributario y el segundo art´ ıculo de la Ley de Creaci´ on del Servicio
de Rentas Internas otorgan a esta Administraci´ on Tributaria la facultad para efectuar la
determinaci´ on, recaudaci´ on y control de los tributos internos del Estado.
El Servicio de Rentas Internas, ha realizado el cruce especial de informaci´ on donde se
veriﬁcan los valores declarados en el rubro Ventas Gravadas y No Gravadas. As´ ı, luego
de revisar las bases de datos con las que cuenta, ha detectado valores atribuibles a la
sociedad a la que usted representa, diferentes a los montos registrados en la declaraci´ on
de impuesto a la renta correspondiente al ejercicio ﬁscal 20XX, seg´ un se puede observar
en el siguiente detalle:
A˜ no
Fiscal
Casillero de la Declaraci´ on
de Impuesto a la Renta
Valor calculado por la Ad-
ministraci´ on Tributaria
Valor declarado por
el contribuyente
20XX 699 - TOTAL INGRESOS 777.499,10 719.153,50
55De conformidad a lo establecido por los art´ ıculos 89 del C´ odigo Tributario y 101 de
la Ley de R´ egimen Tributario, las declaraciones de impuestos efectuadas por los su-
jetos pasivos tienen el car´ acter de deﬁnitivas y vinculantes, por lo que hacen respon-
sables al declarante y al contador que ﬁrmen la declaraci´ on, por la exactitud y ve-
racidad de los datos que contenga la misma; sin embargo el sujeto pasivo, a petici´ on
expresa del Servicio de Rentas Internas podr´ a, dentro de los seis a˜ nos siguientes a la
fecha de presentaci´ on de la declaraci´ on original, rectiﬁcar en una declaraci´ on sustitutiva,
los rubros requeridos por la Administraci´ on Tributaria.
El Art. 19 de la Ley de R´ egimen Tributario Interno y el art´ ıculo 37 de su reglamento,
establecen que todas las sociedades est´ an obligadas a llevar contabilidad y declarar el
impuesto en base a los resultados que arroje la misma. Adicionalmente los libros contables
tienen que estar debidamente respaldados por los correspondientes comprobantes de venta
y dem´ as documentos pertinentes, documentaci´ on toda que puede ser requerida por la
Administraci´ on Tributaria para ﬁnes de control.
En atenci´ on a los antecedentes y a las normas legales citadas, esta Administraci´ on le
apremia a presentar la declaraci´ on sustitutiva correspondiente al impuesto a la renta del
ejercicio ﬁscal 20XX v´ ıa Internet.
Adicionalmente se le recuerda que en la declaraci´ on del impuesto a la renta del a˜ no 20XX
debe registrar el valor del anticipo calculado de impuesto a la renta con cargo al ejercicio
ﬁscal 20XX, de conformidad al art´ ıculo 41 de la Ley de R´ egimen Tributario Interno.
De ser el caso, el sujeto pasivo deber´ a calcular el impuesto, inter´ es y multa a pagar, con-
siderando los pagos previos efectuados, conforme la normativa tributaria vigente respecto
a la imputaci´ on al pago.
Finalmente, se informa al sujeto pasivo que la Administraci´ on Tributaria se reserva el dere-
cho de veriﬁcar oportunamente la informaci´ on contenida en las declaraciones de impuestos,
y que en el caso de que el sujeto activo ejerza su facultad determinadora proceder´ a cobrar
un recargo del veinte por ciento (20%) calculado en base al impuesto determinado; as´ ı
como tambi´ en, que en caso de comprobar la existencia de actos de ocultaci´ on o falsedad,
por los que se haya dejado de pagar en todo o en parte los tributos debidos, en provecho
propio o de un tercero, tales hechos se considerar´ an defraudaci´ on ﬁscal, conforme lo se˜ nala
el art´ ıculo 342 del C´ odigo Tributario y cuyas sanciones se especiﬁcan en el Libro Cuarto
56del mismo cuerpo legal que se reﬁere al Il´ ıcito Tributario.
La asesor´ ıa que se requiera para el cumplimiento de obligaciones tributarias, la puede
obtener en todas las oﬁcinas del Servicio de Rentas Internas a nivel nacional o a trav´ es
de nuestra p´ agina web (www.sri.gob.ec).
Atentamente,
Servicio de Rentas Internas
57